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UNITED STATES DISTICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 
------------------------------------------X 
BOARDING SCHOOL REVIEW, LLC,  
 
    Plaintiff, 
 
v.        11 Civ. 8921 (DAB) 
          MEMORANDUM & ORDER 
DELTA CAREER EDUCATION CORPORATION, 
WESTON EDUCATIONAL, INC., BERKS  
TECHNICAL INSTITUTE, INC., MCCANN  
EDUCATIONAL CENTERS, INC., MILLER-MOTTE  
BUSINESS COLLEGE, INC., SOUTHWEST  
BUSINESS COLLEGES, INC., and THE MIAMI- 
JACOBS BUSINESS COLLEGE CO. 
 
    Defendants. 
-------------------------------------------X 
DELTA CAREER EDUCATION CORPORATION, et al. 
 
   Counterclaim-Plaintiffs, 
 
v.  
 
BOARDING SCHOOL REVIEW, LLC, 
 
   Counterclaim-Defendant. 
------------------------------------------X 
 
DEBORAH A. BATTS, United States District Judge. 
 Plaintiff/Counterclaim-Defendant moves this Court pursuant 
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss Defendants/Counterclaim-
Plaintiffs’ counterclaims, which allege trademark infringement, 
unfair competition, deceptive trade practices, trademark 
dilution, and copyright infringement.  
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As set forth herein, Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss is 
GRANTED as to Defendants’ trademark infringement, unfair 
competition, deceptive trade practices, and trademark dilution 
counterclaims. The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss as 
to Defendants’ copyright infringement counterclaims for 
statutory damages and attorney’s fees but DENIES the Motion as 
to Defendants’ copyright infringement counterclaims seeking 
other relief. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
The following facts are drawn from the Counterclaims, 
documents attached thereto as exhibits or incorporated by 
reference, and websites of which the Court takes judicial 
notice.1
                                                          
1 Defendants ask the Court to take judicial notice of five 
websites: the Miller-Motte College website home page, the 
Heritage website home page, the BSR webpages for Miller-Motte 
College – Cary and Heritage College – Oklahoma City, and a 
Google support page. (See Def. Req. for Judicial Notice.) The 
Court generally has the discretion to take judicial notice of 
internet material. Magnoni v. Smith & Laquercia, LLP, 701 F. 
Supp. 2d 497, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); see also Patsy's Italian 
Restaurant, Inc. v. Banas, 575 F. Supp. 2d 427, 443 n.18 
(E.D.N.Y. 2008) (“It is generally proper to take judicial notice 
of articles and Web sites published on the Internet.”), aff’d, 
658 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2011). In addition, the authenticity of 
the websites and the printouts of the websites which Defendants 
attach to their Request have not been challenged, and they are 
“not subject to reasonable dispute.” Fed. Rule Evidence 201(b). 
 They are taken to be true for the purposes of this 
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Memorandum and Order. Plaintiff / Counterclaim-Defendant 
Boarding School Review, LLC (“BSR” or “Plaintiff”) operates an 
internet website called Community College Review (the 
“website”), accessible at http://www.communitycollegereview.com, 
which provides information on community colleges to prospective 
students. (Counterclaims ¶ 39.) BSR’s website earns revenue by 
the sale of advertising on its website and, Defendants allege, 
Internet leads. (Id. ¶ 49.) The website contains subdomains of 
hundreds of schools, each of which contains information about 
the subject school. Each subdomain or profile contains a brief 
overview of the school, data and statistics comparing the school 
to community college averages, a map of the school’s location, 
and a lead form2 to acquire admissions information. (Am. Compl. 
Ex. A3
                                                                                                                                                                                           
However, the Court fails to see the relevance of the Google 
support page. Accordingly, the Court takes judicial notice of 
the four other webpages and the printouts of those webpages. 
(See Req. Judicial Notice Exs. A-D.) 
 at 6-19; Def. Req. Judicial Notice Exs. C-D.)  
2 A lead form prompts site users to enter their contact 
information. Lead generation is a common form of Internet 
marketing.   
3 Exhibits A and B of the Amended Complaint are incorporated by 
reference in the Counterclaims and may be considered by the 
Court. See Counterclaims ¶¶ 56, 61 (referencing Defendants’ 
demand letters regarding trademarks and copyright material). 
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Defendants/Counterclaim-Plaintiffs Delta Career Education 
Corporation (“Delta”)4 and Weston Educational, Inc. (“Heritage”) 
(collectively “Defendants”) operate postsecondary schools in 
various fields. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 29.) Delta operates over thirty-
seven campuses providing associate degree and diploma programs 
(the “Delta Schools”). (Id. ¶¶ 16-17.) Delta provides its 
educational goods and services under a number of registered 
trademarks (the “Delta Marks”).5 Heritage operates eight campuses 
offering associate degree and diploma programs in the healthcare 
field (the “Heritage Schools”). (Id. ¶ 29.) Heritage also 
provides its educational goods and services under a number of 
registered trademarks (the “Heritage Marks”).6
                                                          
4 Also party to this action are Delta’s wholly-owned 
subsidiaries: Berks Technical Institute, Inc., Career Training 
Specialists, Inc., McCann Education Centers, Inc., Miller-Motte 
Business Colleges, Inc., Southwest Business Colleges, Inc., and 
the Miami-Jacobs Business College Co. (collectively “Delta”). 
(Counterclaims ¶ 15.)  
 The Delta and 
5 The Delta Marks include Academy of Court Reporting, Academy of 
Court Reporting Technology, ACRT, Berks Technical Institute, 
BTI, Miller-Motte, Miller-Motte College, Miller-Motte Technical 
College, Tucson College, Institute for Business and Technology, 
IBT, McCann School of Business and Technology, Lamson College, 
Lamson Institute, Miami-Jacobs Career College, National Career 
Education, and NCE. (Counterclaims ¶ 17.)  
6 The Heritage Marks include Heritage Institute, Heritage 
College, and Heritage Education. (Counterclaims ¶ 30.) 
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Heritage schools are profiled on BSR’s website. (Id. ¶¶ 41-45; 
Def. Opp. at 3-4.)  
In April 2010 and November 2011, counsel to Delta sent a 
series of cease and desist letters (the “Letters”) to BSR. 
(Counterclaims ¶¶ 56, 61.) In its Letters, Delta claimed that 
various trademarks owned or claimed by Delta and used in 
connection with its schools were being infringed on BSR’s 
website. (Am. Compl. Exs. A-B.) Delta claimed BSR’s website was 
a landing page using Delta’s marks and logos to generate 
Internet leads for potential students. (Am. Compl. Ex. A at 1.) 
Delta further claimed BSR made unauthorized use of Delta’s 
YouTube videos, included incorrect information about Delta’s 
schools, and copied descriptions of Delta’s schools from their 
websites. (Am. Compl. Exs. A-B.) Delta contended that these 
actions and others constitute trademark infringement, dilution, 
and unfair competition under the Lanham Act, common law 
infringement and unfair competition under state law, and false 
or deceptive trade practices. (Am. Compl. Exs. A-B.) Delta 
demanded that BSR cease any unauthorized uses of its marks 
including “all advertising and promotional efforts” such as 
“keywords, adwords or domain names that make any reference to 
the Delta Marks,” and cease infringing on its copyrighted 
material. (Am. Compl. Ex. A at 2.) 
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Following receipt of the April 2010 letter, BSR indicated 
that it would remove some of its infringing use of Delta’s Marks 
and copyrighted materials. (Counterclaims ¶ 57.) BSR refused, 
however, to remove all of Delta’s Marks and copyrighted 
materials, claiming it had a right to make use of such materials 
without Delta’s consent. (Id.) In 2011, BSR failed to cease its 
infringing use of the Delta Marks. (Id. ¶ 58.) Around this time, 
Delta learned that after prospective customers were led to the 
website, BSR, through an affiliate entity, collected information 
under the guise of sending the information to Delta or a Delta 
school, and instead sent the information to Delta’s direct 
competitors. (Id. ¶ 60.) 
Meanwhile, in November 2011, Heritage learned that BSR was 
using the Heritage Marks and copyrighted materials on BSR’s 
website in an identically infringing manner. (Counterclaims ¶ 
63.) Consequently, Heritage, represented by the same counsel as 
Delta, allege similar counterclaims against BSR. (Id. ¶¶ 63-70.)  
In December 2011, BSR filed the above-captioned action 
seeking a declaratory judgment, inter alia, that (1) BSR’s use 
of Defendants’ Marks does not violate Defendants’ trademark 
rights, (2) BSR’s use of various works in which copyright is 
alleged to be owned by Defendants does not infringe on any 
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copyright held by Defendants; and (3) BSR’s conduct does not 
constitute false or misleading advertising. 
 On July 5, 2012, Defendants counterclaimed seeking relief 
for trademark infringement, unfair competition, deceptive trade 
practices, trademark dilution, and copyright infringement. 
Subsequently, BSR moved this Court to dismiss Defendants’ 
counterclaims for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Legal Standard for a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 
12(b)(6) 
For a complaint to survive a motion brought pursuant to 
Rule 12(b)(6), the Plaintiff must have pleaded “enough facts to 
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell 
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has 
facial plausibility,” the Supreme Court has explained, 
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 
alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a 
“probability requirement,” but it asks for more than 
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 
unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are 
“merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, it 
“stops short of the line between possibility and 
plausibility of entitlement to relief.” 
 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 
550 U.S. at 556–57). “[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the 
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grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels 
and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 
cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). “In keeping with these principles,” 
the Supreme Court stated, 
[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can choose 
to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they 
are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to 
the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can 
provide the framework of a complaint, they must be 
supported by factual allegations. When there are 
well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should 
assume their veracity and then determine whether 
they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to 
relief. 
 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. 
 
In considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must 
accept as true all factual allegations set forth in the 
Complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
Plaintiff. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 
n.1 (2002); Blue Tree Hotels Inv. (Canada) Ltd. v. Starwood 
Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., 369 F.3d 212, 217 (2d Cir. 
2004). However, this principle is “inapplicable to legal 
conclusions,” Iqbal, 556 U .S. at 678, which, like the 
Complaint's “labels and conclusions,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 
are disregarded. Nor should a court “accept [as] true a legal 
conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Id. at 555. 
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“In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a district court may consider 
the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to the 
complaint as exhibits, and documents incorporated by reference 
in the complaint.” DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d 104, 
111 (2d Cir. 2010). Additionally, “[w]here a document is not 
incorporated by reference, the court may never[the]less consider 
it where the complaint relies heavily upon its terms and effect, 
thereby rendering the document integral to the complaint.” Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). However, though such 
evidence may be considered when attached to or incorporated into 
the Complaint, the Court's function is “not to weigh the 
evidence that might be presented at a trial but merely to 
determine whether the complaint itself is legally sufficient.” 
Holloway v. King, 161 F. App’x 122, 124 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
 
B. Defendants/Counterclaim-Plaintiffs’ Federal Trademark 
Infringement and Unfair Competition Claims 
“To prevail on a trademark infringement and unfair 
competition claim under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a), in 
addition to demonstrating that the plaintiff's mark is 
protected, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant's use of 
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the allegedly infringing mark would likely cause confusion as to 
the origin or sponsorship of the defendant's goods with 
plaintiff's goods.” Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe's Borough Coffee, 
Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 114 (2d Cir. 2009). “In determining whether 
there is a likelihood of confusion,” the Court must “apply the 
eight-factor balancing test introduced in Polaroid Corp. v. 
Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961).” The eight 
factors are:  
(1) strength of the trademark; (2) similarity of the 
marks; (3) proximity of the products and their 
competitiveness with one another; (4) evidence that 
the senior user may “bridge the gap” by developing a 
product for sale in the market of the alleged 
infringer's product; (5) evidence of actual consumer 
confusion; (6) evidence that the imitative mark was 
adopted in bad faith; (7) respective quality of the 
products; and (8) sophistication of consumers in the 
relevant market. 
 
Id. at 115. This balancing test “is not mechanical, but rather 
focuse[d] on the ultimate question of whether, looking at the 
products in their totality, consumers are likely to be 
confused.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Orient Express Trading Co. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 842 
F.2d 650, 654 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[C]ourts are not required to 
slavishly recite the litany of all eight factors . . . [,] but 
need only consider sufficient factors to reach the ultimate 
conclusion as to whether or not there is a likelihood of 
confusion.”)  
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Because the entitlement of Defendants’ Marks to protection 
under §§ 1114(1) and 1125(a) of the Lanham Act is not in 
dispute, the Court turns to whether there is a likelihood of 
confusion. The Court first considers the trademark claim related 
to the following statements appearing on BSR’s website: “Get 
info / application from Miami-Jacobs Career College”; “Get info 
/ application from Miller-Motte Technical College”; “Get info / 
application from Miller-Motte College–Cary”; “Get info / 
application from Heritage College–Oklahoma City.” (Am. Compl. 
Ex. A at 10, 16; Def. Req. Judicial Notice Ex. C at 4; Def. Req. 
Judicial Notice Ex. D at 4.) Defendants, without referring to 
these particular trademark uses, allege that BSR “collects 
information under the guise of sending the information to Delta 
and/or a Delta School, and instead, sends the information to 
schools BSR knows to be in direct competition with Delta and/or 
Delta Schools.” (Counterclaims ¶ 60.) Defendants further allege 
that at BSR’s website, “when a user searches for information 
about HERITAGE College, users were prompted to obtain admissions 
information through a computer prompt, which solicited user 
information.” (Counterclaims ¶ 64.) Defendants then allege that 
“BSR obtains revenue from its sister company who lead [sic] 
Internet users away from Heritage to the services of schools it 
knows to be in competition with Heritage.” (Counterclaims ¶ 65.) 
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It is possible that users who clicked on the links labeled 
“Get info / application from” Defendants’ schools were brought 
to an educational competitor’s website, or were prompted to 
enter user information that was sent to an educational 
competitor. Were this the case, a likelihood of confusion might 
result from the “Get info / application from” links. See 
FragranceNet.com, Inc. v. FragranceX.com, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 2d 
545, 550 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (suggesting that a trademark violation 
might result if Defendant “substitut[ed] its website in response 
to a request for plaintiff's website.”). However, the facts 
alleged in the Counterclaims are “merely consistent with” the 
theory that the “Get info / application from” links brought 
users to Defendants’ competitors; they make the theory no more 
than a “sheer possibility.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The 
Counterclaims therefore “stop short of the line between 
possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
Defendants’ Counterclaims regarding all other uses of their 
Marks on BSR’s website fail under the Polaroid test. The 
likelihood that actual or potential consumers would be confused 
about the source of BSR’s subdomain pages profiling Defendants’ 
schools is remote. The stylized title “Community College Review” 
is featured prominently at the top of BSR’s domain and subdomain 
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pages. (Def. Req. Judicial Notice Ex. C at 1; Def. Req. Judicial 
Notice Ex. D at 1.) Directly below that title is a navigation 
menu directing site visitors to “Find Schools,” “Compare 
Colleges,” or to read “Articles.” (Id.) This header and 
navigational menu clearly and quickly communicate to site 
visitors that BSR’s website is an omnibus review site profiling 
community colleges, not a website affiliated with or sponsored 
by the schools profiled. Moreover, consumers who desire to earn 
post-secondary degrees or prepare for careers in the healthcare 
field are likely sophisticated internet users familiar with the 
distinction between an official school page and a omnibus review 
site. (Counterclaims ¶¶ 22, 32.) In addition, Parties operate in 
distinct industries. Defendants operate a large number of 
educational institutions whereas BSR operates a review site 
profiling community colleges. While both Parties attempt to 
generate leads for prospective students, this hardly renders 
their services proximate to one another. Defendants offer 
prospective clients an education; BSR offers site visitors, 
inter alia, assistance with the educational decision-making 
process. It is unlikely that Defendants will bridge the gap by 
developing their own community college review site. Accordingly, 
the Court finds that Defendants have failed to allege plausibly 
a likelihood of confusion. 
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Because Defendants have failed to allege sufficient facts 
to raise their entitlement to relief above the speculative 
level, BSR’s Motion to Dismiss Defendants’ trademark 
infringement claims is hereby GRANTED. 
 
C. Defendants/Counterclaim-Plaintiffs’ Common Law Unfair 
Competition Claims 
  “The elements necessary to prevail on common law causes of 
action for . . . unfair competition mirror Lanham Act claims.” 
Information Superhighway, Inc. v. Talk Am., Inc., 395 F. Supp. 
2d 44, 56 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). “In addition, to succeed on the 
merits of a common law claim of unfair competition, a plaintiff 
must couple its evidence supporting liability under the Lanham 
Act with additional evidence demonstrating the defendant's bad 
faith.” Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); see 
also Gameologist Group, LLC v. Scientific Games Int’l, Inc., 838 
F. Supp. 2d 141, 165 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Under New York law, 
‘[t]he essence of unfair competition . . . is the bad faith 
misappropriation of the labors and expenditures of another, 
likely to cause confusion or to deceive purchasers as to the 
origin of the goods.’”) (quoting Jeffrey Milstein, Inc. v. 
Greger, Lawlor, Roth, Inc., 58 F.3d 27, 34 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
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 The Court must dismiss Defendants’ claims for common law 
unfair competition for the same reason it dismisses their Lanham 
Act claims: Defendants have failed to allege plausibly that 
BSR’s use of their Marks creates a likelihood of confusion.  
 
D. Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs’ Deceptive Trade Practices 
Claim Under N.Y. General Business Law § 349 
“To state a claim under § 349 a plaintiff must allege that 
‘(1) the defendant's deceptive acts were directed at consumers, 
(2) the acts are misleading in a material way, and (3) the 
plaintiff has been injured as a result.’” Eliya, Inc. v. Kohl's 
Dep’t Stores, No. 06 Civ. 195 (GEL), 2006 WL 2645196, at *7 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2006) (quoting Maurizio v. Goldsmith, 230 
F.3d 518, 521 (2d Cir. 2000)). “However, § 349 ‘is, at its core, 
a consumer protection device,’ Securitron Magnalock Corp. v. 
Schnabolk, 65 F.3d 256, 264 (2d Cir. 1995), not a tool to 
resolve disputes between competitors.” Id. “Courts in this 
district have repeatedly rejected attempts to use section 349 
where the Complaint essentially alleges harm to a corporate 
competitor, not the public at large.” LBB Corp. v. Lucas 
Distribution, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 4320 (SAS), 2008 WL 2743751, at 
*3 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2008). “[F]or the statute to apply, a 
plaintiff must establish a ‘direct harm to consumers’ that is 
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greater than the ‘general consumer confusion’ commonly found in 
trademark actions.” Eliya, Inc., 2006 WL 2645196, at *7. “The 
‘gravamen’ of the claim must be an alleged injury to consumers 
or the general public.” Id. (citing Schnabolk, 65 F.3d at 264). 
“[C]ourts have interpreted the statute's scope as limited to the 
types of offenses to the public interest that would trigger 
Federal Trade Commission intervention under 15 U.S.C. § 45, such 
as potential danger to the public health or safety.” DO Denim, 
LLC v. Fried Denim, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 2d 403, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The conduct need not 
be repetitive or recurring but defendants' acts or practices 
must have a broad impact on consumers at large.” LBB Corp., 2008 
WL 2743751, at *2 (quoting N.Y. Univ. v. Continental Ins. Co., 
87 N.Y.2d 308, 320 (1995)). “Where the only alleged harm is that 
which is generally associated with violations of intellectual 
property law, courts in this district have found that plaintiffs 
cannot state a claim under § 349.” Eliya, Inc., 2006 WL 2645196, 
at *8. 
Nothing in Defendants’ Counterclaims approaches a plausible 
allegation of the type of direct and broad harm to consumers or 
the general public that would trigger Federal Trade Commission 
intervention. Instead, the Counterclaims essentially allege harm 
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to Defendants rather than the public at large. Accordingly, 
Defendants’ § 349 claim is DISMISSED.  
 
E. Defendants/Counterclaim-Plaintiffs’ Federal Trademark 
Dilution Claims 
To prevail on a federal trademark dilution claim, a 
plaintiff must prove that (1) its mark is famous and 
distinctive, (2) its mark is used in commerce by the defendant, 
and (3) the defendant’s use is likely to cause dilution through 
either “blurring” or “tarnishment.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1). A 
mark is famous if it is “widely recognized by the general 
consuming public of the United States” as a designation 
indicating a single source of goods or services. Id. § 
1125(c)(2)(A). The Lanham Act identifies a non-exhaustive set of 
factors courts may consider when determining whether a mark 
possesses the requisite degree of recognition:  
(1) the duration, extent, and geographic reach of 
advertising and publicity of the mark, whether 
advertised or publicized by the owner or third 
parties; (2) the amount, volume, and geographic extent 
of sales of goods or services offered under the mark; 
(3) the extent of actual recognition of the mark; (4) 
whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 
3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905 or on the 
principal register.  
 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A)(i)-(iv). 
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Courts applying these criteria have generally limited 
famous marks to those that are “almost universally recognized by 
the general public.” Heller Inc. v. Design Within Reach, Inc., 
No. 09 Civ. 1909 (JGK), 2009 WL 2486054, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 
14, 2009). The Second Circuit, for example, has explained that 
marks such as Dupont, Buick, and Kodak exemplify famous marks 
entitled to anti-dilution protection. TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar 
Commc’ns., Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). Similarly, 
district courts within the Second Circuit have explained that § 
1125(c) “limits federal dilution claims to truly famous marks 
like Budweiser beer, Camel cigarettes, Barbie Dolls, and the 
like.” Luv N’ Care Ltd. v. Regent Baby Prods. Corp., 841 F. 
Supp. 2d 753, 758 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). Moreover, “[t]he degree of 
fame required for protection under § 1125(c) must exist in the 
general marketplace, not in a niche market.” Kuklachev v. 
Gelfman, 600 F. Supp. 2d 437, 472 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)(dismissing 
dilution claim on a 12(b)(6) motion because plaintiff’s mark was 
not “truly famous”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Luv N’ Care Ltd., 841 F. Supp. 2d at 757 (dismissing dilution 
claim on a 12(b)(6) motion because plaintiff’s marks were only 
famous within a niche, not among the general consuming public); 
Heller Inc., 2009 WL 2486054, at *4 (same).  
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The Court finds that Defendants have failed to plead 
sufficient facts making it plausible that their Marks are famous 
and thereby entitled to anti-dilution protection under § 
1125(c). Defendants’ general allegations that their Marks have 
“fostered wide renown [sic] with the trade and public” and have 
“great value and secondary meaning among the consuming public” 
(see Counterclaims ¶¶ 22, 28, 32) are labels and conclusions not 
entitled to a presumption of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 
Defendants’ other allegations, at best, make it plausible that 
their Marks are recognized within the niche market of for-
profit, post-secondary schools. Allegations that Defendants own 
at least fourteen educational institutions, provide educational 
services to at least 16,000 people, have one subsidiary that has 
operated for more than 100 years, have invested “enormous” sums 
of money in marketing, provide services that are “highly sought 
after,” and have experienced “extraordinary and longstanding 
sales success” do not make it plausible that Defendants’ Marks 
are truly famous to the general consuming public of the United 
States. (Counterclaims ¶¶ 17, 18, 21, 22, 29, 31, 32.) 
Accordingly, BSR’s 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Defendants’ 
federal trademark dilution claims is hereby GRANTED. 
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F. Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs’ Claims for Injury to 
Business Reputation and Dilution under N.Y. General 
Business Law § 360–l 
New York General Business Law § 360-l provides that 
“[l]ikelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of 
the distinctive quality of a mark or trade name shall be a 
ground for injunctive relief . . . notwithstanding the absence 
of competition between the parties or the absence of confusion 
as to the source of goods or services.” N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 
360-l. “Unlike federal trademark dilution law . . . , New York's 
trademark dilution law does not require a mark to be ‘famous’ 
for protection against dilution to apply.” Starbucks Corp. v. 
Wolfe's Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 114 (2d Cir. 2009). 
State law, unlike federal law, “requires a showing of a mere 
likelihood of dilution.” Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & 
Bourke, Inc., 454 F.3d 108, 119 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal 
quotation marks and ellipsis omitted). In addition, “New York 
law does not permit a dilution claim unless the marks are 
‘substantially’ similar.” Starbucks Corp., 588 F.3d at 114.  
“Similar to federal trademark dilution law under 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(c), section 360-l has been interpreted to provide for 
protection against both dilution by blurring and tarnishment.” 
Id. “‘[D]ilution by blurring may occur where the defendant uses 
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or modifies the plaintiff's trademark to identify the 
defendant's goods and services, raising the possibility that the 
mark will lose its ability to serve as a unique identifier of 
the plaintiff's product.” Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson 
Productions, Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 506 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting 
Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994)). 
Therefore, blurring does not occur where a defendant’s use of a 
plaintiff’s mark “tends to increase public identification of a 
plaintiff's mark with the plaintiff.” Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, 
Inc. v. Nature Labs, LLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 410, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002); see also Hormel Foods Corp., 73 F.3d at 506 (finding no 
blurring where the parody "tend[ed] to increase public 
identification" of the mark with the senior mark holder); N.Y. 
Stock Exch., Inc. v. N.Y., N.Y. Hotel, LLC, 69 F. Supp. 2d 479, 
490 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (rejecting blurring claim because "the 
challenged marks explicitly refer to the [senior user], and 
their success depends on a customer making a connection with the 
original marks"), aff'd in part, rev'd on other grounds, 293 
F.3d 550 (2d Cir. 2002).  
Here, Defendants have failed to allege plausibly that BSR’s 
use of Defendants’ Marks raises the possibility that the Marks 
will lose their ability to serve as a unique identifier of 
Defendants’ educational institutions. BSR’s website catalogues, 
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describes, and compares community colleges. (Def. Opp. Exs. C-
D.) Its use of Defendants’ Marks “causes no loss of 
distinctiveness, since the success of the use depends upon the 
continued association of the mark with” Defendants’ educational 
institutions. Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 2d at 
422; see also N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 69 F. Supp. 2d at 490. 
Indeed, BSR’s website tends to increase public identification of 
Defendants’ Marks with the educational institutions they 
represent, by describing the educational institutions in detail. 
(Def. Opp. Exs. C-D.) This is the very opposite of blurring.  
 “Tarnishment occurs where a trademark is ‘linked to 
products of shoddy quality, or is portrayed in an unwholesome or 
unsavory context,’ with the result that ‘the public will 
associate the lack of quality or lack of prestige in the 
defendant's goods with the plaintiff's unrelated goods.’” N.Y. 
Stock Exchange, Inc. v. N.Y., N.Y. Hotel LLC, 293 F.3d 550, 558 
(2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Deere & Co., 41 F.3d at 43). Although 
“tarnishment is not limited to seamy conduct,” id. at 558 
(internal quotation marks omitted), courts are “careful not to 
broaden section [160-l] to prohibit all uses of a distinctive 
mark that the owner prefers not be made.” Deere & Co., 41 F.3d 
at 44. Here, Defendants have failed to allege plausibly that BSR 
has linked Defendants’ Marks to products of shoddy quality or 
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are portrayed in an unwholesome or unsavory context. 
Accordingly, Defendants’ Counterclaims pursuant to N.Y. General 
Business Law § 360-1 are DISMISSED. 
 
G. Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs’ Copyright Infringement 
Claims 
“In order to demonstrate copyright infringement, a 
plaintiff must show ownership of a valid copyright and copying 
of the protectable elements of the copyrighted work.” Scholz 
Design, Inc. v. Sard Custom Homes, LLC, 691 F.3d 182, 186 (2d 
Cir. 2012). “[T]he Copyright Act grants the copyright holder 
‘exclusive’ rights to use and to authorize the use of his work” 
in the specific ways enumerated in the statute, “including 
reproduction of the copyrighted work in copies.” Sony Corp. of 
Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432-33 
(1984). “To prove infringement, a plaintiff must show that: (1) 
the defendant actually copied the plaintiff's work; and (2) the 
copying is illegal because a ‘substantial similarity’ exists 
between the defendant's work and the protectible elements of the 
plaintiff's work.” Streetwise Maps, Inc. v. VanDam, Inc., 159 
F.3d 739, 747 (2d Cir. 1998). 
BSR argues that Defendants contractually waived their right 
to sue for copyright infringement of the videos Series 2 TV 
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Spot: 2 For 1 and Heritage Graduate Chris S. when it placed 
those videos on YouTube. (Pl. Mem. in Supp. 23-24.)7
                                                          
7 In BSR’s Reply brief, it makes new claims regarding whether the 
works are entitled to copyright protection and whether BSR 
copied the works in their entirety. (Reply Mem. 8.) However, the 
Court need not consider claims first raised in a reply brief, 
see Cantor Fitzgerald Inc. v. Lutnick, 313 F.3d 704, 710 n.3 (2d 
Cir. 2002), and declines to do so here. 
 In support 
of this claim, BSR cites to YouTube’s Terms of Service. The 
YouTube Terms of Service, however, were not alleged in, attached 
to, or incorporated by reference in the Counterclaims; nor do 
the Counterclaims rely heavily upon their terms and effect. The 
Court also declines to take judicial notice of the YouTube Terms 
of Service. Although the Court generally has the discretion to 
take judicial notice of internet material, see Magnoni v. Smith 
& Laquercia, LLP, 701 F. Supp. 2d 497, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), BSR 
offers nothing to authenticate the online contract as the 
contract governing Defendants’ relationship with YouTube. 
Accordingly, the Court cannot and does not find at this stage in 
the proceedings that Defendants waived their right to sue for 
copyright infringement of the videos they placed on YouTube. See 
Fed. R. Evid. 201(b) (“The court may judicially notice a fact 
that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it . . . can 
be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy 
cannot reasonably be questioned.”). 
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Under the Copyright Act, “the fair use of a copyrighted 
work, including such use by reproduction in copies . . . for 
purposes such as criticism, comment . . . or research, is not an 
infringement of copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 107. “Whether such ‘fair 
use’ exists involves a case-by-case determination using four 
non-exclusive, statutorily provided factors in light of the 
purposes of copyright.” Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling 
Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 608 (2d Cir. 2006). These factors 
are:  
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used 
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market 
for or value of the copyrighted work. 
 
17 U.S.C. § 107. “At bottom, however, whether a particular use 
of a copyrighted work constitutes fair use depends on ‘whether 
the copyright law's goal of promoting the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts would be better served by allowing the use than 
by preventing it.’” Swatch Group Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. v. Bloomberg 
L.P., 808 F. Supp. 2d 634, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting Bill 
Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 608).  
The Court cannot address the fact-intensive issue of fair 
use after reviewing only the pleadings. Accordingly, the Court 
declines to determine whether BSR’s use of Defendants’ 
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copyrighted works was a fair use before the Parties have 
completed discovery. See, e.g., Swatch Group Mgmt. Servs., 808 
F. Supp. 2d at 641 (declining to address the issue of fair use 
before Parties had opportunity for discovery); Browne v. McCain, 
611 F. Supp. 2d 1073 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (“[I]n light of a court's 
narrow inquiry at this stage and limited access to all 
potentially relevant and material facts needed to undertake the 
analysis, courts rarely analyze fair use on a 12(b)(6) motion.”) 
 “Under 17 U.S.C. § 412, a plaintiff may not recover 
statutory damages or attorney's fees for any infringement 
‘commenced’ before the effective date of a copyright's 
registration.” Troll Co. v. Uneeda Doll Co., 483 F.3d 150, 158 
(2d Cir. 2007). “The courts have held, based on the provision's 
text, legislative history, and purpose, that a plaintiff may not 
recover statutory damages and attorney's fees for infringement 
occurring after registration if that infringement is part of an 
ongoing series of infringing acts and the first act occurred 
before registration.” Id.; see also Inst. for Dev. of Earth 
Awareness v. People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, No. 08 
Civ. 6195 (PKC), 2009 WL 2850230, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2009) 
(same). 
 Here, Defendants may not recover statutory damages or 
attorney’s fees because all alleged copyright infringement 
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commenced before the effective dates of the relevant copyright 
registrations. The effective dates of all specific copyright 
registrations alleged by Defendants are on or after May 17, 2012 
(Counterclaims ¶¶ 25-26, 35-36; Counterclaims Exs. 2, 3, 5.) The 
alleged copyright infringement regarding the MMTC website 
commenced, at the latest, in April 2010. (Am. Compl. Ex. A.) The 
alleged copyright infringement regarding the Series 2 TV Spot: 2 
for 1, the Heritage website, and Heritage Graduate Chris S. 
commenced, at the latest, in November 2011. (Am. Compl. Ex. B; 
Counterclaims ¶¶ 37, 63.)  
 Defendants, in their Opposition brief, attempt to assert a 
claim for statutory damages and attorney’s fees for “any works 
that were registered before the infringement was discovered.” 
(Def. Opp. 16.) They argue that the pleadings “raise a 
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal” that BSR 
infringed copyrighted works other than the four works 
specifically referenced in the Counterclaims. (Id. 17.) However, 
Defendants have failed to plead facts that allow the Court to 
draw the reasonable inference that BSR’s infringement commenced 
after the effective date of a copyright’s registration. See 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. They plead that their copyrighted 
material “includes, but is not limited to,” four particular 
works which Defendants have registered with the U.S. Copyright 
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Office. (Counterclaims ¶¶ 25-27, 35-37.) Merely stating that 
Defendants’ copyrighted material “is not limited to” these four 
works does not constitute factual content making it plausible 
that BSR infringed additional copyrighted works. Accordingly, 
the Court DISMISSES Defendants’ counterclaims for statutory 
damages and attorney’s fees pursuant to the Copyright Act. 
However, the Court DENIES BSR’s Motion to Dismiss Defendants’ 
counterclaims seeking relief other than statutory damages and 
attorney’s fees pursuant to the Copyright Act. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, BSR’s Motion to Dismiss 
Defendants’ Counterclaims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 
is GRANTED as to Defendants’ counterclaims for trademark 
infringement, unfair competition, deceptive trade practices, and 
trademark dilution, as well as to Defendants’ copyright 
infringement counterclaims for statutory damages and attorney’s 
fees. BSR’s Motion is DENIED as to Defendants’ remaining 
copyright infringement counterclaims. 
When a complaint has been dismissed, permission to amend it 
shall be freely given when justice so requires. Fed. R. Civ. P. 
15(a)(2). However, a court may dismiss without leave to amend 
when amendment would be futile, or would not survive a motion to 
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dismiss. Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. City of Sherrill, 
337 F.3d 139, 168 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'd on other grounds, 544 
U.S. 197 (2005). “Where the plaintiff is unable to demonstrate 
that he would be able to amend his complaint in a manner which 
would survive dismissal, opportunity to replead is rightfully 
denied.” Beachum v. AWISCO New York Corp., 459 F. App’x 58, 59 
(2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Hayden v. Cnty. of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 
53 (2d Cir. 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 The Court GRANTS Defendants leave to amend their federal 
and state trademark infringement, federal and state unfair 
competition, and state trademark dilution counterclaims 
regarding the “Get info / application from” hyperlinks featured 
on the printouts of BSR’s webpages. (See Am. Compl. Ex. A at 10, 
16; Am. Compl. Ex. C at 12; Def. Req. Judicial Notice Ex. C at 
4; Def. Req. Judicial Notice Ex. D at 4.) All other trademark 
infringement, unfair competition, deceptive trade practices, and 
trademark dilution claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, as are 
Defendants’ copyright infringement claims for statutory damages 
and attorney’s fees. Amendment of these claims would be futile 
or would not survive a motion to dismiss. 
 Any amended counterclaims shall be filed within forty-five 
days of the date of this Order. Failure to do so shall result in 
dismissal with prejudice of all claims except for the Copyright 
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Act counterclaims for relief other than statutory damages and 
attorney’s fees. 
 
 SO ORDERED. 
 DATED:  March 29, 2013 
   New York, New York 
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